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Introductory remarks
According to René Girard, all religious traditions - and so every tradition- 
originate from a communitarian violence towards a randomly chosen indivi-
dual. Tradition, for him, signifies a course of social history which emerges 
from a primordial source and develops in relation to such source.
The main building blocks of his theory are threefold:
a) mimetic desire;
b) the scapegoating mechanism; 
c) the establishment of myths and rituals by delusive memories of the violen-
ce towards the scapegoat. 
Girard provides a number of construals of the theory across different disci-
plines, by relying on evidence and debates from psychoanalysis, sociology, 
literary criticism, philosophical anthropology, philosophy of religion, bible 
criticism, and more. However, each of these versions of the theory develop 
the same simple proposal, albeit in different cognitive fields. 
The skeletal story can be told as follows. 
Humans are moved by desires, and desires are constrained by imitation. To 
put the issue more succinctly, the mimetism of desire causes the desire of a 
few individuals to spread throughout the group (this is the block (a) of the 
theory). 
The natural outcome of this process, according to Girard, is envy and rivalry. 
Envy and rivalry generate hostility and social conflict. At this point, the 
group is internally fragmented by a potentially destructive force. The resolu-
tion of this frightening situation consists in individuating a scapegoat and kil-
ling him. There are no compelling reasons to explain why one individual or 
another is chosen to play this role. It is completely a random affair. In any 
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case, the violence that kills the scapegoat is a collective doing and, as a conse-
quence, peace is restored within the group (here is (b) block). 
The murder of the scapegoat deeply affects all of the participants in the vio-
lence. On the one hand, persecutors satisfy their mimetic desire for revenge. 
On the other hand, social reconciliation is enjoyed as a direct effect of the sca-
pegoat’s death. As a result, the scapegoating event is then preserved by a col-
lective memory, one that is ill-formed. It is a delusive account of the event. 
Nevertheless, it leads to a ritualization whose main purpose is to exorcise the 
renewal of conflict originated by social rivalry and envy. If the scapegoat 
were to have resisted the violence, he or she would likely have been identi-
fied with a hostile divinity. On the contrary, when the victim accepts his or 
her fate, the scapegoat will progressively become deified. Cultures, then, are 
established by the ritual and symbolic repetition of crowd violence in com-
munitarian memories, which determine what meaningfully matters to a pe-
culiar group (this is the last block of the theory, namely, block (c)). 
It is plainly evident that the theory is ambitious: Girard’s purpose is to identi-
fy and understand in detail the universal mechanism explaining how the se-
mantic value of myths is originally established, and, subsequently, cultures 
and local histories are generated.  It is not surprising that his theory attracted 
criticism from all sides (Frear 1992). To begin with, it is easy to see that the 
theory states too much (even if some myths match the theory’s analysis, there 
are many other myths which cannot be reconciled with the theory on pain of 
a counterintuitive interpretation; e.g., myths grounding the divine powers 
over the mundane realm into the victorious fight against a hostile animal - 
see narratives of Indra defeating Vitra; myths telling a primordial war bet-
ween two kinds of Gods - see narratives of the Asir-Vanir war within Norse 
mythology); that it is affected by the constitutive indeterminacy of its mea-
ning and wide range of application (i.e., there is no clear methodology used 
in referring to evidence and employing arguments from different cognitive 
fields); that it is unfalsifiable (i.e., it is not clear which counterexample would 
be successful, given that any myth which apparently does not fit with the 
theory could be interpreted as a socially veiled construct which has covered 
the primordial violence fro which it originates).
It is not my intention to address any of these difficulties (primarily because 
literature by scholars who specialize on this issue abounds). Rather, in what 
follows, I will be concerned with a technical approach to Girard’s characteri-
zation of the communicative process which leads to the individuation of the 
scapegoat. In my view, this perspective provides an interpretive framework 
which is able to do justice to some basic insights of Girard’s theory. Further, it 
clearly highlights which issues need to be resolved, and suggests which direc-
tions could be followed. Girard’s comment on the Book of Job (Girard 1987, 
from here on JVP) offers a privileged testing ground for the theory because it 
focuses explicitly on how rhetorical devices by which persecutors persuade 
all the members of their community to use violence to Job works. 
The remainder of my paper is divided into four sections. In the second sec-
tion, I will address a conceptual view of the theory by making explicit its 
principles and their inferential relations. In the third section, I will explain 
how philosophers of language address slurs and hate-speech. Particularly, I 
will apply such materials to Girard’s assumption that the three friends’ di-
scourses to Job are instances of hate-speech. My purpose is to defend the use 
of a presuppositional account of derogatory epithets in the philosophy of re-
ligion, and to argue for the legitimacy of reading a number of religious state-
ments which cement a social group into a “we” in opposition to an individual 
who is individuated as an instance of a “not-we” as slurs. In the fourth sec-
tion, I will argue that, if Girard is right in thinking that speech-hate and the 
use of slurs are means for the identification of a scapegoat within a group, 
then Girard’s theory needs to be adjusted in order to accommodate some ob-
vious difficulties. Finally, in the fifth section, I will sum up my conclusions 
and then provide a few suggestions for defending the theory.
A conceptual analysis of Girard’s view
I will begin by translating Girard’s skeletal story into a core theory about the 
violent origin of all traditions. This core theory may be named in different 
manners. My preference goes to the victimage mechanism view (VM). My point 
of departure is to lay down some definitions which help understanding how 
the three blocks of Girard’s skeletal story are related. 
Mimetic desire requires that individuals who enjoy it belong to the same 
group.  The notion of belonging to the same group can be spelled out in terms of 
the conjunction of the relations of sharing an environment with … (S), possessing 
the same conceptual tools as … (P), and being collaborating with … (C). According 
to common usage, the notation R(x,y) stands for relation R holds between x and 
y. Then, x and y belong to the same group if:
Belonging=def For any x and y, S(x,y) & P(x,y) & C(x,y).
Now, suppose that x has a desire P, y has a desire Q, ..., z has a desire Z.  P(x) 
is an abbreviation for x desires P, Q(x) is an abbreviation for y desires Q, and 
Z(z) is an abbreviation for z desires Z. This suffices for defining mimetic desi-
re:
Mimetic desire=def For any x, y, and z, if x, y, z belong to G, then W(x), W(y), 
W(z), where W is a desire of one of the individuals belonging to G. 
It is important to Girard that there are no clear intrinsic reasons for why W 
becomes the desire of all the members of G. It cannot be assumed that some 
desires are more objectively attractive than others. Rather, it is a matter of 
chance that a desire prevails. The mechanism of imitation determines that a 
desire will become universal within the group, but cannot explain which de-
sire will be on the target of the mimetic choices of the members of the group 
(Antonelli 2010). Therefore:
By-chance group desire=def For any x and y, if P(x) and Q(y) at time t0, and 
P(x) and P(y) at time ti, there is no other reason for Q(y) changing into P(y), 
except the imitation of P(x) by y.
At this point, given that the resources for satisfying a desire are limited wi-
thin groups:
Rivalry=def For any x, y, and z belonging to G, if a mimetic desire prevails wi-
thin G, a conflict among x, y, and z arises.
The distinctive feature of Girard’s theory consists in that rivalry does not re-
sult in a destructive war among individuals because any individual’s envy 
unifies with other individuals' envy into a collective desire of doing violence 
towards a member of G. Such a member is the scapegoat, and the crowd vio-
lence which puts an end to rivalry within G is the scapegoating sacrifice:
Scapegoating=def For any x, y, and z belonging to G and experiencing rivalry, 
a by-chance group desire causes the individuation of one between x, y, and z 
as the target of a destructive violence done by the others. 
Suppose x is individuated as a scapegoat by y and z, and, accordingly, killed 
by them. The remaining members of G will experience this as a relief from the 
desire to have P which generated the intra-group conflict. As a consequence, 
peace substitutes violent hostility. The confused mixture of feelings related to 
such an event generates a delusive memory of the events concerning scape-
goating:
Delusive memory=def For any y and z who killed x as a scapegoat, y and z 
will form incorrect remembering of their violence.
Such delusive memories are the content of the ritualization of scapegoating. 
In order to prevent hostility from emerging again within G, members of the 
group will arrive at establishing a symbolic repetition of the original crowd 
violence. Therefore:
Ritualization=def For any x, y and z belonging to a group G, x, y and z will 
perform symbolic experiences translating the original crowd violence from 
which G arose into a collective and codified action.
Finally, when x is killed by members of their group, x can undergone such a 
killing by accepting passively their fate or reacting actively against it. This 
provides how to spell out the process of divinization: 
Divinization=def For any y and z belonging to G, there existed an x killed as a 
scapegoat by preceding members of G, such that if x accepted passively their 
fate, x is ritually changed into a benign deity, otherwise x is understood as ac-
ting under the influence of hostile gods.
Evidently, (a), (b), and (c) are logically independent. A desire can grow by 
imitation within a group without generating scapegoating or divinization 
phenomena. For example, close male friends may be all attracted by the same 
woman and individuate her as their erotic dream without falling into violent 
practices within their group nor transforming her into a deity. Further, divini-
zation may concern natural objects to which crowd violence towards a scape-
goat seems unrelated (e.g., worships of astral objects in most mythological 
systems). Finally, scapegoating may be a strategy for unifying a group whe-
rein social tensions are not destructive at all, do not depend on mimetic desi-
res and do not result into a divinization process (e.g., the homophobia and 
transphobia characterizing conservative ideologies in democratic societies di-
scriminate homosexual and transgender individuals even in non-competitive 
contexts).
This being the case, VM should be represented as a conjunction of (a), (b), and 
(c). Nonetheless, Girard seems to think that there is some form of implicature 
between mimetic desire and scapegoating, and also scapegoating and divini-
zation. Particularly, a tradition emerges from the necessary generation of sca-
pegoating, that is, from a mimetic desire and the establishment of a diviniza-
tion process of the scapegoat. Therefore, the VM view requires some princi-
ples for warranting that (b) involves (a), and (c) follows from (b).
In order to see how these principles may be stated, let us take a look at the 
way the above definitions characterize (a), (b), and (c). 
Block (a) is specified by belonging, mimetic desire and by-chance group desi-
re. Evidently belonging and by-chance group desire are the conditions for the 
social spreading of a mimetic desire. The former is necessary for making it 
possible that humans can focus on what others desire. The latter is the mile-
stone of the theory: imitation precedes desires because no intrinsic value can 
be ascribed to what one wants except that others want this too (Girard 2003). 
Let x, y, z be individuals of the group G. It results that:
1. For any x, y, z, P(x) & P(y) & P(z) are due to mimetic desire if [S(x,y,z) & 
P(x,y,z) & C(x,y,z)] & P is the outcome of by-chance group desire.
Now, block (b). Scapegoating is an answer to rivalry:
2. For any x, y, z, belonging to G and experiencing a mimetic desire, if x, y, 
and z stand in a rivalry relation, one among x, y, and z will be chosen as a 
scapegoat and then killed by others.
Finally, block (c). How myths and cultures develop their understanding of 
meaningful representations of reality depends on either what is condemned 
in the scapegoat, in case it is divinized into a hostile god, or what is admired 
in their sacrifice, in case it is divinized into a benign deity. That is, the attribu-
tion of a semantic value to mythical propositions is performed in terms of the 
actual content of the delusive memory of scapegoating. Therefore, diviniza-
tion involves ritualization, and ritualization involves delusive memory:
3. For any y and z belonging to G, wherein there existed an x killed as a sca-
pegoat by preceding members of G, x is assumed as a divine entity if a sym-
bolic representation of the murder of the scapegoat is available and such re-
presentation relies upon a delusive memory.
The main intuition characterizing VM is that the transition from (1) to (2) is 
necessary. If a group originated a tradition, the group passed through a cro-
wd violence towards a scapegoat. This means that the mimetic desire must 
always be somewhat satisfied: there is a non suppressible relation between 
enjoying a desire and searching for an answer to it. David Berman provides  
anecdotal evidence that various form of deferred desires always return (Ber-
man 2009). It is reasonable to assume that desires related to the construal of 
cognitive, social and psychological identity are stronger than others, in other 
words, that mimetic desire cannot be bracketed. VM accepts then a principle 
of satisfaction concerning desire:
Desire satisfaction=def For any x, y, z, belonging to G and experiencing a mi-
metic desire, x, y, and z must satisfy their desire
However, desire satisfaction is not enough for warranting the transition from 
(1) to (2). Evidently, (2) is a strategy for resolving a conflict which is generated 
by the principle, but cannot account for why restoration of peace should un-
dergo a violent communitarian event. A further principle is then required. 
Call this exorcism by revenge:
Exorcism=def For any x, y, z, belonging to G and experiencing a mimetic desi-
re P, if rivalry cannot make possible the satisfaction of P, x, y, and z will chose 
by chance one among them as the target of a violence which satisfies oblique-
ly their unanswered desire.




iv. if (1) & (desire satisfaction) & (exorcism), then (2),
v. (2).
Such as for the claim that (2) follows from (1), VM assumes a similar state-
ment that the occurrence of a divinization practice for the generation of a tra-
dition is a necessary requirement. What relation does necessity stand in? 
Focus must be placed on how peace replaces rivalry. While any violent joint 
action may create a diversion from a competitive desire, enduring effects may 
be occasioned by the exceptionality of the violent event. It may be that the 
target or the course of actions actualize a similar exceptional feature. The cru-
cial point is, however, that exceptionality should be acknowledged as such. If 
so, the relevance of the content and kind of violence for the relief from the so-
cial anger of anyone towards others, is to be found in the degree of awareness 
that the violence itself creates the removal of tensions within the group. The 
intuition is that scapegoating is the source of divinization only if scapegoa-
ting is acknowledged as the result of an intentional group action which the 
persecutors perform together.
A very quick look at a few evidence from evolutionary sciences concerning 
predatory behaviors of chimpanzees may offer some suggestions for the de-
velopment of this intuition. It is widely assumed that chimpanzees exhibit 
hunting behaviors which differ across populations (Boesch & Boesch, 1989; 
Hobaiter & others, 2017) and are motivated by a number of diverse purposes 
(Newton-Fisher 2015). While predation is an obvious means to access food, 
predating by chimpanzees does not seem to depend on the necessity to 
achieve resources, being more concerned with the obtaining of social goals 
(Mitani & Watts, 2001). This means that chimpanzees are not obligate carni-
vores. They associate indeed in clusters of hunters mostly for in-group dy-
namics related to alliances and ranking relations: preys are commonly shared 
as gift for achieving social recognition. Particularly, chimpanzees hunting in-
volves collaboration and joint agency among the members of a population 
(Samuni & others, 2018; contrary evidence in Tomasello 2016). 
All things considered, the enjoyment of a violent and unnecessary action by 
groups of chimpanzees causes an increase of social bonds among participants 
(i.e, enhancement of friendship and alliances and a new assessment of ran-
king relations among individuals who share preys) and provides them with 
the satisfaction of socially induced desires (i.e, meat acquires the status of a 
gift to be rewarded, despite it is not a primary food resource).
Now, humans collaborate in a pervasive and intentional manner to such a 
degree that a qualitative behavioral difference between great apes and human 
beings is an obvious matter of fact. Nonetheless, such a difference is instantia-
ted within similar patterns of behavior, due to evolutionary common ance-
stry. Particularly, it is reasonable to assume that humans differ from chim-
panzees in enjoying violent group actions by reason of their ability to develop 
group intentionality based on mutual acknowledgment of reciprocate inten-
tions. That is to say, the motivation of violent group agency in both chimpan-
zees and humans answers in-group relational pushes which, in turn, cause 
unity of belonging and uniformity of appetites, but humans actualize actions 
with a supplement of control, namely, intentionally.
This being the case, the grammar of ritualization should be based on how 
group intentionality shapes the content of scapegoating related events.   In-
tentionality puts on focus the awareness of a goal-directed action. When in-
dividuals act together against the scapegoat, they rely on evident features 
which the scapegoat possesses. Such features are assumed as evidence for 
that the scapegoat deserves to be killed for mandatory reasons, and the ac-
complishment of this duty is the means to restore group peace. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to hypothesize (within a Girardian framework) that what tran-
sforms a crowd violence satisfying social goals into the source of a tradition is 
the degree of awareness towards the presumed normative consequences of 
the scapegoating. The more the group benefited from its violence, the more 
the understanding of such violence as a right or normative answer to the de-
structive feature of the scapegoat is favored. Necessary transition from (2) to 
(3) then requires a principle for the normative reading of collective delusive 
memories:
Focus on normativity=def For any x, y, z, belonging to G and participating in a 
crowd violence toward a scapegoat, the more conflict is replaced into peace 
within G as a result of a focused attention on the killing event and normative 
understanding of it, the more memories of the event will be delusive and will 
favor the accommodation of scapegoating into a ritualization and diviniza-
tion of related events.
It turns out that:
i. (2),
ii. (focus on normativity),
iii. (2) overcomes the threshold degree in (focus on normativity) for accom-
modating scapegoating into a myth (call this filling up),
iv. If (2) & (focus on normativity) and (filling up), then (3).
v. (3).  
Summing up, VM can be characterized as an account of how desire satisfac-
tion and revenge activated by a mimetic desire cause scapegoating, and sca-
pegoating is transformed into a myth generating a tradition by focus on nor-
mativity.
Derogatory epithets as means for individuating scapegoats and discrimina-
ting against them
Girard’s comment on the Book of Job consists in a detailed defense of the claim 
that, contrary to the outcomes of traditional exegesis, the text is not a consola-
tory treatise on the mystery of evil; rather, it is a transcript of a public trial 
against a once celebrated influential man named Job. The outcome of the trial 
is that Job’s persecutors persuade the members of their community to commit 
group violence against him. Later editors of the text added the prologue and 
all necessary interpolations in order to mitigate the evidence that the matter 
at issue was a trial. More specifically, they aimed at conforming the existent 
narrative with the delusive memories arose from scapegoating (from here on 
I will refer to Girard’s claim as the persecuting reading of Job, P for short). If P is 
sound, the Book of Job turns out to be an outstanding source for understanding 
how the scapegoating mechanism works. Girard also argues for some theolo-
gical consequences following from the interpretation. However, I do not ad-
dress them, nor will I investigate any further than what the comment advan-
ces in support of the theory I have just outlined, namely, VM.
Furthermore, it is not my intention to evaluate whether P is correct, nor to 
advance objections. There is indeed room to develop the argument by intro-
ducing a framework for dealing with how the alleged derogatory discourses 
against Job make their way into the community. That is to say, further con-
structive efforts on P are required before evaluating his conclusions. For this 
reason, my research plan is purely explorative: I will assume Girard’s per-
spective, and I will inquire into what a technical approach to hate-speech 
suggests in order to enhance his proposal and highlight his conceptual com-
mitments. 
The main reason for sustaining P is that the three friends constantly charge 
Job with following the ancient trail of the wicked men (JVP, 14-18, 22). Far from 
providing any real consolation, their discourses may be read as attacking Job 
on behalf of the omnipresent assumption that he must have committed cri-
mes against God, given that, apparently without reason, he lost all his wealth, 
social acknowledgment, and power. That is, Job's actual condition is  an alle-
ged sign of God’s hostility toward him. Girard’s efforts are here focused on 
giving a systematic reading of the presumed consolatory discourses by the 
three friends in line with the open attack to Job’s wrongdoings subsequently 
advanced by Elihu. For example, Eliphaz’s suggestion that Job’s life resem-
bles a well-known pattern, namely, the life of the tyrant, plays a fundamental 
role in Girard’s argument because it relates the crimes of the wicked to the 
arbitrary exercise of power by unjust politicians (this is exactly what Elihu 
claims). It is such an exercise of power which makes Job deserving the horri-
ble and violent punishment alluded by Elihu. Things have always gone this 
way with arrogant powerful men: they are raised to a mundane glory at first, 
but they will be destroyed violently by God at last (JVP 14, 22). 
According to P, the main characters of the text are individuals coming from 
the same upper social context of Job. They are moved by envy towards Job’s 
high political and social status (JVP 51). Particularly, they are bothered by his 
undisputed prestige within the community. What they are doing through 
their discourses, then, is trying to persuade the remaining members of the 
community that Job must be killed, and that all people should take part in the 
violence as a service offered to remove evil from their society (JVP 52-59): the 
conflicts generated by mimetic desire within the upper class spread into the 
community (by mimesis, again) and induce the group to commit violence to-
wards a scapegoat, namely, Job.
The motivation of Girard’s reading calls attention to two features of the stra-
tegy by the opposers to Job. First, they make significant use of traditional as-
sumptions: they depict Job according to the common standards applied to 
evil men who made terrible sins against God. Second, they are never sympa-
thetic towards Job’s psychological, moral, and bodily sufferings. As a result, 
they continually rely on the attribution of derogatory epithets to Job: he is the 
enemy of God, the accursed one, the wretch, and the wicked man.
Since such use seems to involve intentional references to a rhetorical device, 
namely, hate speech through using slurs, it makes sense to assess this use in 
view of a few technical considerations about pejorative language. My claim is 
that accusers employ enemy of God, accursed one, wretch, and wicked man as 
slurs in order to promote active discrimination against him. Moreover, by 
characterizing such terms’ features as in line with slurs, it is possible to intro-
duce a simple and plausible account of how the persecutors' attack on Job 
causes public discrimination. Accordingly, either defending P can be disen-
tangled from the assumption of a deeply exotic theory like mimetic desire is, 
or, alternatively, a non-exotic theory for the spreading of envy can be propo-
sed and used for explaining how mimetic desire transfers from upper classes 
to the whole of community.
Slurs are derogatory terms which offensively target a class. Typically, they 
address overtly discriminated groups because of sexual orientation (faggot, 
dyke), gender identity (tranny), ethnic origins (chink, wop, boche), or religious 
belonging (kike). However, they can concern almost any aberrant behavior or 
feature. For example, members of a school may offend a classmate who has 
obtained high level grades with the offensive swot; fat people may be teased 
by using terms as fatso; policemen are pejoratively termed screw or pigs. Some 
scholars distinguish between derogatory epithets which attack an individual 
as a member of a class to be discriminated against (this is properly the case of 
slurs) and those which attack an individual for their peculiar features. Accor-
ding to this distinction swot and fatso should not be classified as slurs. None-
theless, the distinction between insulting an individual because of their being 
an exemplar of a discriminated class and offending an individual because of 
their peculiar feature is not so sharp as some scholars claim (Jeshion 2013). 
Actually, terms such as swot, fatso, and others may be used to name an indivi-
dual independently of derogatory attitudes towards all diligent or fat people. 
However, employing them for individuating a group and assuming that all 
diligent or fat people have similar behaviors to be condemned is a standard 
use. The crucial point is to distinguish between the insulting power of a term 
for an individual and how individuals adhering to the same class of the insul-
ted one feel offended by the use of the very term (Ashwell 2016, Nunberg 
2018). 
This suggests that slurs are to be characterized by way of their referential and 
evaluative features. Almost all slurs have neutral counterparts which indivi-
duate the same target without being derogatory. Suppose that Ps is a slur tar-
geting offensively class P and Pn is its non insulting corresponding terms for 
P. Saying that x is Ps is evidently different from saying that x is Pn in that whi-
le the former attributes to x the offensive qualifying feature referred by Ps , 
the latter does not attributes it to them, simply describing them as an instance 
of Pn. To provide an example, consider what happens when Ps stands for fag-
got and Pn stands for gay man. If I says that John is a faggot, at best I evidently 
mean to say that John is a gay man and John deserves to be teased because being a 
gay man involves something ridiculous. However, in a worse case, my statement 
is to be spelled out as the conjunction of John is a gay man and John deserves to 
be reproached because being a gay man is a bad fact. All considered, neutral coun-
terparts of slurs are completely referential and are used descriptively to indi-
viduate a group. On the contrary, slurs contain a negative evaluation about 
the targeted class, and they insult someone by discriminating against the 
class that they belong to at the same time. 
The distinctive feature of slurs is that they do not apparently answer ordinary 
truth-conditional semantics. The derogatory character survives any quantifi-
cation, connective, or modal operation on content (Hess forthcoming). Sup-
pose I say that John is not a faggot, or that I deduce from some premises that 
John must not be a faggot or that John cannot be a faggot. According to a truth-
conditional semantics, negation and modal operators change the truth-value 
of a statement by reason of how the content of the proposition is handled by 
negation and modal operators themselves (the same holds for the way quan-
tifiers act on a sentence). Nonetheless, a sentence containing a slur does not 
change its truth-value in conformity with how quantifiers, connectives or 
modal operators act upon it: slurs resist any such operation and yet still insult 
the targeted class. It is not important if I negate that John is a faggot, or if I con-
clude from some premises that he must not be or he cannot be one. In any case, I 
continue to offend all gay men by assuming that there is a class of faggots and 
such a class identify with that of gay men. Preliminary quantitative research 
seems to attest that the derogatory power of slurs remains indeed embedded 
across conditionals and modal operators, and is testified in negation by rea-
son of its metaliguististic reading (e.g., empirical reports of sentences like John 
is not a faggot show that they are not evaluated offensive like the positive in-
stance, because they are interpreted as John is not a faggot, he is a gay man in 
fact, namely, negating the proposition does not concern whether John is a fag-
got or not, but states that there does not exist a class of faggots, Panzeri & 
Carrus 2017). 
As a consequence, the fundamental issue about slurs concerns their semantic 
behavior. How does the insulting feature of sentences containing slurs resist 
the use of quantifiers, connectives and modal operators? There are three 
competing views: the semantic approach, the social approach and the prag-
matic approach. The semantic approach holds that slurs are never descripti-
ve; they do not convey any information about the world. That is, the meaning 
of slurs is merely a prescription of discriminating against the targeted class. 
Although such a view does justice to the evaluation feature of slurs in terms 
of irremovable derogatory effects, it seems unable to grasp that offensiveness 
survives negations and conditionals. Strictly speaking, it cannot provide a 
sound account of the fact that slurs and their neutral counterparts behave dif-
ferently under negations and conditionals (Cepollaro 2015). The social ap-
proach characterizes slurs as taboos in relation to sets of possible utterances. 
Grossly speaking, any society regulate what can and cannot be said of so-
meone by prohibiting the use of some terms. The main intuition supporting 
such an approach is that neutral counterparts of slurs are able to express ar-
gumentative practices against their target without being insulting. It is a mat-
ter of fact that individuals may direct non insulting criticism to groups by 
reason of the features they involve (although such non insulting criticisms 
possibly still sound like an offense to any member of the targeted class). Reac-
tions to such criticism affect the social dynamics of language use, by promo-
ting taboos towards slurs and changing their status in relation to how much a 
term is perceived as offensive. For example, neutral terms for religious belon-
ging as Roman Catholic were once thought of as slurs: while they become now 
accepted, taboos have been imposed on their slurring counterparts (papist). 
However, the social approach is defeated by the impossibility to account per-
suasively for how a term initially becomes a slur and why a taboo is raised 
over it (i.e., the use of neutral counterparts seems involving that it is possible 
to discriminate against minorities, all that is required is that discrimination be 
rationally sustained by polished language and argumentative practices, even 
if the content of such practices is as crazy as possible; consequently, it can be 
asked, why should any taboos be erected towards slurs?). Finally, the prag-
matic approach, the most popular of which is the presuppositional account, is 
the claim that slurs should be analyzed by both their referential and evaluati-
ve character. When I say that John is a faggot, my sentence expresses two pro-
positions: that John belongs to the targeted class, that is, he is a gay man, and 
that the targeted class should be discriminated against because of that homo-
sexuality is always wrong. According to such a view, quantifiers, connectives 
and modal operators leaves the offensive character of slurs untouched becau-
se they act on the referential side, but have no effect on the (offensively) eva-
luative one. That is to say, the nature of the derogatory power which slurs ac-
tualize relies on the evaluative presupposes conveyed by the use of a slur. 
Each approach vindicates peculiar intuitions which account for some features 
of slurs. Consequently, it can be a winning strategy to pursue a complex and 
rich analysis which balances all the different motivations and employs diffe-
rent pieces of theory for accounting for simultaneous (apparently) differing 
characters. Empirical evidence suggests that such a theoretically refined mo-
del may have some merits (Technau 2016). However, I will favor the presup-
positional account here on account that: it provides a convincing explanation 
for embedding; it makes good sense of how discriminatory practices against 
the targeted groups are socially pursued; it is based on the social sharing of 
offensive assumptions, which reveal to be crucial for understanding religious 
hate speech. I am not claiming that the presuppositional account is universal-
ly the better strategy at disposal. I simply assume that it is so within a reli-
gious context, especially, an ancient mythology sources context (I will provide 
a few lines of argument in support in a while). 
The interesting thing about the presuppositional account is that it provides an 
attractive analysis of how the use of slurs promotes active discriminations 
against a group or resistance to their very use. Bianca Cepollaro draws three 
main ways of characterizing reaction to the use of slurs (Cepollaro 2017): en-
dorsement; complicity and propaganda; rejection. According to the first mo-
dality, the audience of a sentence wherein a slur occurs shares the offensive 
presupposition with the speaker. In a such a case, using slurs does not have 
the function of simply uttering discriminatory claims; rather, it strengthens 
the identity of the audience, by giving all individuals a group identity which 
binds them into a we-group on the ground of a common discrimination 
against another group (a non we-group). Sharing discriminatory assumptions 
mitigates differences within the group and puts the focus on individuals’ 
constitutive relationship to other members. The second form occurs when the 
speaker does not know if their offensive assumption is shared with the au-
dience previous to the utterance. Before the use of a slur, the speaker and au-
dience do not constitute an explicit discriminatory context, because it is not 
clear whether the speaker and their audience actually share a given discrimi-
natory assumption. However, the speaker utters a sentence containing a slur, 
and none of the audience turns out to be interested in rejecting the offensive 
presupposition it entails. That is, the presupposition is silently and universal-
ly assumed by the audience. Accordingly, the speaker and the audience tran-
sform into a group which comes to explicitly share the presupposition, and 
shows to support the discriminatory views of the speaker. The outcome is 
that a putatively neutral social context changes into a discriminatory we-
group against some other non we-group. Finally, rejection. Suppose that wi-
thin a situation similar to the one promoting complicity and propaganda so-
meone opposes the speaker after the utterance of the slurring sentence. In this 
context, there is no slippery road arriving at a commonality of discriminatory 
assumptions from an unanswered presupposition. Nonetheless, the rejection 
scenario presents a relational behavior which is cognitively and socially ex-
pensive (Cepollaro 2017, pp. 59-61). It involves that someone contends the 
very use of slurs by stopping the conversation: rejecting the presupposition is 
a matter of avoiding any dialogue which starts by denigrating others for their 
being members of a discriminated group. If this occurs, argumentative colla-
boration ends, and this is not obviously a beneficial outcome. As a conse-
quence, slurs show themselves to be dangerous instruments in the hands of 
persecutors: they initiate conflict if opposed; they promote complicity in de-
rogatory practices if not opposed by reason of avoiding a conflict.  
In light of this discussion, come back to P. To begin with, I will observe that 
slurs are familiar items in religious discourse. To mention just a paradigmatic 
case, consider how Jesus violently reproached Pharisees in Mt 23.13. The rea-
son for his contention was that he thought that the Pharisaic law system con-
tradicted the spirit of the tradition, and promoted behavioral codes contrary 
to God’s will. When he referred to them, he called them hypocrites. Due to the 
cultural influence of the Christian movement, the meaning of Pharisee has 
slowly drifted to hypocrite. Today, given the term’s dense value of disdainful 
reproach, saying that someone is a Pharisee is a non refined manner of attac-
king them (i.e., competent users of language understand Pharisee as more ne-
gatively evaluative than hypocrite). Obviously, an adherent to Pharisaic Judai-
sm may feel strongly offended by this use of the word, which behaves plainly 
as a derogatory epithet to their perspective. 
The semantic account deals with Pharisee by claiming that it cannot say any-
thing about the world, Pharisee being used as a slur. However, this assump-
tion clashes with the evidence that Pharisee is also a plainly referential term. 
When used like an insult, it targets an actual class and presumes that such a 
class should be discriminated against. That is, the semantic view cannot make 
justice to the fact that religious slurs as Pharisee actually refer to a class: a pha-
risee can categorize their identity by labelling by the term. What a member of 
a discriminated class certainly rejects, then, is not the use of the label, but the 
presupposition that the targeted class should be discriminated against for its 
being it as such (consider as evidence for my claim that discriminated classes 
sometime adopt the slur directed against them as a mark of proud self-identi-
fication; e.g., nigger). This is typical of terms like Pagan, Mohammedan, Russelli-
te, Jew and any other labeling of religious traditions or denominations: when 
these terms are used by fundamentalist sectarians (and even conservative na-
tionalists), the distance between slurs and their neutral counterparts vani-
shes, and the neutral counterpart takes the place of the slur by becoming a 
slur itself. Naturally, the referential feature of the term cannot be bracketed in 
the derogatory use: there is a memory in the word which makes the referen-
tial feature overlap with the derogatory one.
The social account is tackled by difficulties too. The most evident consists in 
that there is no sharp distinction between the slurring and the referential use 
of terms as Pharisee, and, accordingly, there are not clear methods for establi-
shing when the slurring use should promote the imposition of a taboo. That 
is to say, the social account cannot explain how taboos should affect the dero-
gatory use of a term which is simultaneously employed non derogatorily wi-
thin a pluralist social setting (e.g., the term Jew is sometimes used as a slur; 
nonetheless, Jews identify themselves by using the term, and any proposal to 
reform such use by the reference to neutral counterparts as Israelite may 
sound equally derogatory).
Finally, the pragmatic account. Objections of the previous kind leave the view 
untouched, because the different uses of terms by a community (that is, both 
referential and evaluative uses) can be explained in terms of the different pre-
suppositions which the members of different groups endorse. 
Now, I shift to motivate why enemy of God, accursed one, wretch, and wicked 
man are slurs. According to my claim, the accusers of Job intentionally use 
these terms as slurs. The idea is that they mean to activate a public reproach 
of Job by individuating him as a member of a class to be discriminated again-
st qua its being as such. To this end, directing slurs at him points at making 
explicit a sum of presuppositions assumed by the audience which provide 
reasons to violently attack him, at least in their eyes. If they are successful in 
making people think that the use of enemy of God, accursed one, wretch, and 
wicked man is appropriate to Job, Job is then recognized by the community as 
a scapegoat to be eliminated, and no further inquiry is required to destroy 
him.
Let us then take a closer look at the claim. In my presuppositional account of 
slurs (I will limit my exemplification to the term enemy of God for reasons of 
simplicity, the same holding for other ones previously referred to), when so-
meone say that x is an enemy of God in the context of the community of Job, 
the individual intends to qualify x as a member of a class to be discriminated 
against by reasons of his/her existence alone. The term individuating the tar-
get class (i.e., enemy of God) is interpreted by a derogatory presupposition di-
rected to the class itself. 
It may be objected that this is not exactly how it works. For example, it may 
be that the accusers’ use of the term is purely referential, and accordingly, it 
sounds neutral and non derogatory. A descriptive reading of the term could 
be expressed by construing it as whoever acts as Job does commits crimes against 
God, and, accordingly, deserves punishment. In support of this, it can be argued 
that it is no easy task to see which presupposition, by way of focusing on a 
plainly evident feature, individuates Job as a member of a group to be di-
scriminated on account of such feature. 
This claim is not convincing, however. Some have indeed a tendency to di-
stinguish between what an individual behaviorally actualizes in terms of his/
her intentions and what he/she actually achieves. Following such a disposi-
tion, no exterior sign in Job’s fate seems an observable feature according to 
which he can be legitimately categorized belongs to Job’s community. On the 
contrary, a common ground in any conservative form of religiosity (as those 
of the accusers is, JVP, 52-53; 62) is the assumption that successes and failures 
in life are necessary consequences of morally good or wrong individual natu-
re (JVP, 77-80; call this postulate necessary origination of luck from character, LC 
for short). Bad luck is an exterior sign that something is not morally good at 
all about the individual experiencing it. Now, at the beginning of the narrati-
ve, Job was a very powerful man. He was loved by everyone, he was rich and 
healthy, and had a strong and enviable family. Things have drastically chan-
ged without any evident reason, and, during the dialogue with the three so-
called friends, he is depicted as a miserable infirm who constantly complains 
and who is avoided by everyone in the community. Consequently, if LC is as-
sumed, Job has a plainly detectable exterior feature which allows him to be 
categorized into a class to be discriminated against. 
It is worth noting that the Book of Job, as most of the contemporary biblical li-
terature devoted to the problem of evil, is, in a substantive sense, a critical 
reaction to the assumption of LC. The fact that holy men may be objects of 
unmotivated violent actions and experience unhappy lives is obviously evi-
dence against LC, and should be addressed. The widespread existence of lite-
rature concerning how to fix the issue testifies that the necessitarian postulate 
was actually a common ground for people living in the times of Job (Simian-
Yofre 2005). As a consequence, that Job had to be a horrible man affected by his 
wrongdoings was certainly a shared assumption among his persecutors. Bad 
luck turns out to be a qualifying sign of a peculiar class of individuals, name-
ly, bad men. Slurs targeting such class are the ones employed by Job’s accu-
sers. In conformity with this, enemy of God, accursed one, wretch, and wicked 
man should be read as follows: x is a bad man, namely, he is a man experien-
cing an evil luck (1), and it is required that x should be discriminated against 
because of their bad luck (2). The former proposition expresses the referential 
character of the slurs against Job, the latter is the presupposition containing 
the derogatory content promoting persecution. 
Girard calls attention to another reason for considering the assumption of LC 
a common ground: Job himself sometimes speaks the language of his accu-
sers, and seems to endorse LC (JVP, 126-132). Accordingly, what appears par-
ticularly pitiful in Job’s complaints is that, given his assent to the necessita-
rian postulate, he suspects that he has committed some crimes but he cannot 
understand what crimes he might have committed or when he might have 
committed them. Girard writes that he “reaches the point where he doubts 
his own innocence” (JVP, 128). However, the difference between Job and his 
persecutors should be traced back to their different use of the rhetorical devi-
ces available within their common tradition. Both accept LC, but, while his 
accusers make it explicit by an outrageous language which offensively em-
ploys dense terms, Job quietly inquiries about what he could be guilty of, gi-
ven the assumption of LC. This means that Job disentangles the evaluative 
presupposition conveyed by the slurs against him, by researching whether 
the presupposition is sound. On the contrary, the persecutors intentionally 
use their slurs for discriminating against Job. 
If the attack on Job consists in a significant use of hate speeches by slurring 
terms, the presuppositional account makes available a story about the spread 
of discrimination. Girard thinks that the process leading from the envy of Job 
felt by his peers to the other members of the community is a long trajectory 
(JVP, 52). Nonetheless, P provides only disjointed hints about how this trajec-
tory may have developed. Following the presuppositional account, the pro-
cess can be characterized as follows. At first resentment spreads among the 
upper class. This stage provides a good example of the scenario of endorse-
ment. Friends of Job come to constitute a cluster of intimate individuals who 
defer their own internal conflicts by uniting against Job. Their use of slurs 
binds them into a group which identifies itself by opposing the class of indi-
viduals to which Job actually belongs. Subsequently, individuals from the 
upper class begin to direct slurs towards Job in public situations. It may be 
imagined that on such occasions people react differently. LC is a common 
ground for all. However, the matter at issue is whether Job exhibits the rele-
vant bad luck for being embodied in the class targeted by enemy of God, accur-
sed one, wretch, and wicked man. When the accusers name Job in those ways, 
they certainly do not find resistance. As is evident, rejection in the use of a 
slur is cognitively and socially expensive in every situation. In a society un-
dergoing enduring social conflicts as that of the Book of Job is (many passages 
of the Book depict a context wherein different parties, groups, and individuals 
physically fight each other), rejecting a received perspective may turn out to 
be additionally costly. Where conflicts occur, assuming strongly critical atti-
tudes towards consensus requires a high degree of bravery and an in-depth 
willingness to fight. It seems plausible, therefore, that, even if someone had 
disagreed with insulting Job, they would have remained silent. Since no one 
rejects the use of slurs against Job, the complicity and propaganda scenario 
characterize later stages of the community’s reaction to the attack on Job. In 
this way, LC becomes a mean for actualizing an active discrimination against 
him.  
For this reason, the trial has the fate of changing into a slaughter. The use of 
slurs helps us to see why. While Job investigates the evaluative feature of the 
slurs directed against him, the community progressively feels complicity, 
propaganda, and endorsement by identifying itself against Job. There are two 
opposed modalities for the assessment of Job’s alleged sins: a methodical ana-
lysis versus hate speech. It seems natural that when the majority pursues the 
latter, individuals who attracts criticism does not have it easy: a totalitarian 
violence motivated by futile reasons bursts onto the scene. 
Discussion of VM in light of P
The Book of Job provides a paradigmatic case study for VM. According to P, it 
is a testimony of the scapegoating related events both from the viewpoint of 
the persecutors and the victim. Differently from ordinary myths, delusive 
memories are kept together with the dissonant and rebellious voice of the 
scapegoat refusing to accept the viewpoint of the remaining community: Job 
denounces the arbitrariness of the violences he undergoes (JVP, 35, 38-40). As 
a consequence, P is of crucial importance because, if it sounds, it provides 
fundamental evidence in support of VM. Now, interpreting P by the fra-
mework of the presuppositional account of slurs highlights a few points whi-
ch may help to ground and develop VM in a way that secures the theory 
against traditional criticisms. 
A number of related issues concern the format of the definitions of the main 
concepts of VM. Almost all include a universal quantification. This move is 
required by Girard’s insistence that unanimity is the clearest feature of my-
thology: myths are the outcome of a monolithic process, the result of which is 
that no individual escapes the mimetism of desires (JVP, 51) and is able to 
break the univocal community’s perspective (JVP, 111-112). Mimetism is a tool 
for explaining how such uniformity is possible, and unanimity against the 
scapegoat is the mark attesting that the crowd violence will put an end to so-
cial conflicts within the community. However, universality is a difficult requi-
rement to meet, and involves various genres of difficulties. First, it pursues a 
costly and possibly blind strategy by reducing the plurality of motives for so-
cial agency and the complex occurrence of in-groups dynamics to a single 
homogeneous frame. Such a strategy is costly because it unnecessarily multi-
plies the net of concepts in order to account for the matter at issue; and it is 
blind because it is insensitive to the real pushes which shape group agency. 
Second, Girard’s focus on uniformity and unanimity exposes VM to easy re-
futation: it suffices to provide a case which does not fit the characterization of 
the definitions, and the game is over (e.g., myths reluctant to be reduced to 
the scapegoat mechanism may not follow the logic of mimesis, nor present a 
situation of unanimity within its content; further, myths involving fights 
among opposing parties break the law of unanimity: for example, the war 
between Titans and Gods shows cases of doxastic disagreement within both 
parties, and individuals’ desertion, as well). Third, it makes the unconvincing 
claim that the persecutors are “completely representative” of all individuals 
belonging to the community: uniformity involves that all univocally think the 
same (JVP, 62). Such a view is hardly able to accomodate features of religious 
beliefs like anecdotalness, ambiguity, and vagueness (Bertini 2018, Bertini 
2020a, Bertini 2020b, Bertini 2020c). 
Universal quantification is not necessary, however, because uniformity is not 
an irrevocable notion. Actually, the appearance of unanimity may be accoun-
ted for in a way which does not presume assumptions which are difficult to 
defend. That is to say, the spreading of a shared feeling of doing violence to 
Job can be easily explained in terms of the communitarian hate speech. More 
precisely, it is the systematic use of slurs conveying LC to persuade the com-
munity that killing Job is necessary to restore peace: crowd violence origina-
tes there. In this situation, unanimity is what is to be expected. According to 
Cepollaro’s rejection scenario, indeed, deniers of the use of slurs against Job 
are determined to give up their public role as opposers. A live-and-let-live 
strategy seems on point. They do not intend to fight. As such, motivations for 
rejecting the use of slurs do not occupy any dialogical space. The fact is not 
that there is unanimity: rather, that if dissenters do not publicly charge perse-
cutors, their doxastic options disappear.
Further difficulties for VM come from the transition from (1) to (2). Girard’s 
ground belief is that social events are mostly a matter of the relationship bet-
ween persecutors and victims (JVP, 120-123). In order to argue that conflicts 
within groups promote arbitrary and unmotivated reasons for discriminating 
randomly against someone, Girard thinks that the mimetism of by-chance 
group desires is required. In actuality, if a few desires were to escape the qua-
lification of mimetism, there would be room to hold that desires belong to 
two different sets, namely, mimetic desires and non mimetic desires. The 
former would always depend on contingent facts and motives, for example 
belonging to the same group or desiring something because I realize that others desire 
it. On the contrary, the latter would rely on intrinsic features, for example 
being natural or having strong reasons for preferring something. Consequently, 
while mimetic desires would be completely a matter of chance (this justifies 
their shaping by by-chance group desire), non mimetic desires would appear 
determined by non random motives. In case a conflict arose among instances 
of the two sets, it would be difficult to qualify this as a by-chance event cha-
racterized by unanimity. If I had a pretension to the naturalness or rationality 
of my desires, I would not probably have the intention of dismissing them in 
face of their contrariety to the desires by other individuals, given that they 
would experience them only by a process of social induction which is genera-
ted by close contact with one another. As a consequence, I could rationally 
argue that my desire are better grounded than those of others, and deserve a 
deeper degree of satisfaction.
To the purpose of avoiding that a similar situation may provide objections to 
the ground belief about persecution and victimism, Girard’s strategy consists 
in denying that desires can be categorized in terms of a dualist taxonomy. Na-
turally, this move seems implausible enough. First, even if all desires would 
be mimetic, it does not follow that they will be all by chance (as it is stipula-
ted by clause (1)). Like all primates, humans are driven by imitative beha-
viors on account of evolutionary pushes (Farmer, Ciaunica, & de C. Hamil-
ton, 2018). Empirical findings seem supportive in that imitation is not led by 
randomness, but is governed by a selective focus on learning from others. 
That is, contrary to Girard’s construal of imitation, imitation may be directed 
by selective intentionality: we do not imitate whatever we see in others; ra-
ther, we choose what is relevant to our ends at a given time (Gellen & But-
telmann 2017). Second, even if all desires are mimetic and random, the as-
sumption of (exorcism), which is necessary to warrant the transition from (1) 
to (2), appears problematic. For, on the one hand, desires may not raise issues 
of satisfaction. As a consequence, it may be the case that an individual enjoy-
ing a desire may be able to reject it, and, accordingly, cut off the reasons for 
conflict. For example, in the rejection scenario, people endorsing a live-and-
let-live strategy suppress their desire to oppose an illegitimate use of slurs. 
While, on the other, it is hard to see how (exorcism) can give an answer to de-
sires’ satisfaction. Suppose that John and Paul are two colleagues. John wants 
to have sex with Paul’s wife (because in conformity with the logic of mimeti-
sm, they live side by side, and Paul desires to have sex with his wife). Such a 
situation generates conflicts among them: John tries to destroy his desire, but 
he cannot actually do it and, as a consequence, his behaviors begin to be sha-
ped by anxieties, and this affects their relationships by arising tensions. Now, 
both of them strongly dislike Teddy, a further colleague. After the crisis bet-
ween John and Paul, they join one with the other to bully Teddy at work. 
John and Paul feel a genuine relief from their mutual anxieties by making 
Teddy’s job life a living hell. Their complicity is restored. However, it does 
not seem to be the case that the situation should remove Paul’s desire to have 
sex with John’s wife. What happened is simply that Paul’s desire was tempo-
rarily deferred. At the first occasion, Paul’s desire to have sexual intercourse 
with John’s wife might return if, for example, if he saw Paul passionately kis-
sing her.
Now, mimetism and exorcism by way of revenge are ingredients for the as-
sumption of an implicature relation between (a) and (b). I think that a con-
struction of VM in terms of the conjunction of (a), (b), and (c) is preferable be-
cause it is in line with the evidence that the three blocks are logically inde-
pendent. Nonetheless, the Girardian who wants to defend the implicature re-
lation can give up the problematic assumption of (1) and (exorcism) and re-
place them with the assumption of a presuppositional account of slurs as a 
mean to explain the emergence of a scapegoating event within the communi-
ty.
This leads me to the last block of difficulties for VM. These difficulties con-
cern the role played by (focus on normativity) in managing the transition 
from (2) to (3). Girard probably assumes explicitly this principle. According to 
him, things go as follows (JVP, 81-85). Once the scapegoat is killed, the com-
munity establishes a ritual consisting in the symbolic repetition of the mur-
der. Myths are the intellectual counterpart of the performance of ritual: they 
are the understandings of the semantic content which gives form to the delu-
sive memories of the event. This means that rituals give rise to a performative 
tradition consisting in a narrative about how the scapegoat’s crimes broke the 
sacred order of society and, in this way, generated way the necessity to de-
stroy the origin of these detours. As a consequence, the emergence of mea-
ning by means of the repetition of the ritual is the basic fact grounding any 
communitarian understanding of life, religion, government (JVP, 97). What 
distinguishes occasional crowd lynching from the communitarian murder is 
exactly the symbolic repetition that establishes the normative contents by 
means of which evaluating the world. Such repetition puts focus on the nor-
mative constraints of what matters. As earlier, Girard’s explicit attention is on 
unanimity. Mythological traditions rely on the univocal perspective of the 
persecutors. 
However, if (focus on normativity) is declined in terms of unanimity, things 
resist Girard’s analysis. Most polytheist religions do not show the uniformity 
assumed by VM. Consider the mythology connected to the War of Troy. Divi-
ne characters commonly adhere to opposing parties. Moreover, oppositions 
often turn out in open hostility and conflict. Some gods help the Greek army, 
others the Trojan one. In the end, the Greeks win the war. Nonetheless, the 
motivations of both the winners and losers are equally represented and ar-
gued for in the mythological narrative. As such, both positions survive the 
past: the doxastic spectrum transmits the testimonies of all the characters ac-
ting in the whole process. This outcome cannot be expected, given the way 
Girard understands (focus on normativity). 
A possible defense of unanimity can be spelled out by distinguishing bet-
ween mythologies and religions. While the former originate in traditions in 
which the only viewpoint admitted is the persecutors’, the latter are characte-
rized by dualism: religions give testimony to the victims’ revolt against their 
persecutors. As a consequence, religions provide simultaneous access to both 
the persecutory events (in the mythological portion of their Revelation texts) 
and the victims’ crying out against them (in the authentically religious por-
tion). Such a view is a generalization of Girard’s approach to Judaism and 
Christianity (JVP, 151-153). Although Girard assumes that only the Judeo-
Christian tradition is actually successful in demythicizing its mythological 
past, a Girardian non-confessional framework may be developed in order to 
argue that all religions work this way. According to such a hypothesis, reli-
gions may arise from mythologies when a sum of mythological narratives 
(about scapegoating) are collected together in a plurality of revelation texts. 
Once this happens, opposing viewpoints on semantic content related to the 
peculiarities of different myths are blended together into a single conceptual 
system of representations. Possibly, such a conflation is a consequence of mi-
gratory movements and wars between neighboring populations. At the end, 
the different groups unite into one social entity. Their original mythological 
materials are preserved together. However, since losers are defeated by win-
ners, their myths acquire a new role: they became the voice of a victimized 
people. Therefore, the history of each religion may be accounted for as a tran-
sition from the unanimity of their ancient sources to the pluralist viewpoint 
of their mature stages. 
Tempting as it seems, such a strategy turns out to be very weak. In actuality, 
the crucial point is that a similar process involves a self-aware measure of re-
flection about the integration of myths under a common interpretive context. 
It is a matter of fact that the establishment of canonical texts is a posteriori 
and historical event - this is the case for every religion: someone works on a 
plurality of religious narrative and disentangles the valid from the unsound 
ones. Two relevant things follow. First, myths change meaning over time. 
This means that they are newly created by different interpretations. The con-
clusion is that, even if a myth originated from a scapegoating, subsequent in-
terpretations break the connection with the original material and generate a 
new system of meaningfulness which does not depend on the original scape-
goating. This being the case, VM is defeated. Second, (focus on normativity) 
cannot have the unanimity feature which Girard attributes to it. The interpre-
tive processes arriving at the formation of a religion are indeed long historical 
trajectories. When canonizers list at last what is a Revelation text and what is 
not, they are heirs to a tradition of debates on normative issues related to the 
meaningfulness of myths. Many positions are developed along the way. Ac-
cordingly, myths come to testify to a plurality of alternative doxastic options 
about meaning (each of which become unrelated to the presumed scapegoa-
ting at a certain point of history). Again, unanimity vanishes, and VM turns 
out to be unwarranted in the transition from (2) to (3) (at least if (focus on 
normativity) is spelled out in a Girardian fashion). 
The presuppositional account of slurs comes to VM’s aid. It can be assumed 
that (focus on normativity) actually plays a basic role without falling into Gi-
rard’s characterization of it. The idea is that different stages of the interpretive 
history of a myth may be associated with how the several scenarios related to 
the use of slurs overlap at different times. A degree approach seems useful 
here. The more a myth conveys an univocal viewpoint, the higher the degrees 
of endorsement flowing into complicity and propaganda are at its origin. As 
shown, rejection is never lacking: it is obscured by the “live-and-let-live” do-
xastic modality. It is then reasonable to postulate that, when unanimity is an 
evident feature of a myth, the degree of rejection is low. Accordingly, those 
who deny the use of slurs reject any possible action related to explicit argu-
mentation of their perspective. Nonetheless, rejection attitudes may become 
more substantive among deniers. Since this is the case, a doxastic conflict ap-
pears. Some will react to the deniers’ claim by endorsement which subse-
quently flows into complicity and propaganda. The more a rejection scenario 
generates endorsement among implicit deniers, the more two parties divide 
the doxastic spectrum. In this way, a plurality of perspectives enters the se-
mantic content of the myth. There is indeed a focus on normativity in the 
transition from myth-generating-events to the establishment of myths, al-
though such a focus is not governed by unanimity but by the exercise of gro-
wing degrees of rejection of the discriminations against the victims of crowd 
violence. 
Concluding remarks
Above, I argued that, if Girard is right in assuming P, the presuppositional 
account of slurs helps us to see how the hate speech employed by Job’s perse-
cutors fuels the community attitude toward him that pushes the crowd to kill 
him as a scapegoat. A further outcome is that the same account is able to pro-
vide a simple explanation of the trajectory departing from discriminatory 
communitarian events and arriving at the construal of semantic normativity 
without introducing exotic doctrines which are difficult to defend.
My suggestion is to use a few of Girard’s ideas for developing an account of a 
peculiar kind of myths, namely, those related to the discriminatory practices 
of the majority social group against minority ones and isolated victims. Some 
may ask whether a theory renouncing the unanimity of perspective in mytho-
logy, mimetic desire, exorcism by revenge, and univocal focus on normativity 
is still a variety of Girardism. The answer is possibly negative. However, I 
cannot see how making a regimented use of apparently fruitful ideas by 
combining them with a complex and theoretically grounded and empirically 
informed understanding of desires, social conflicts, and doxastic oppositions 
within communities should be pursued under the dogmatic constraints of the 
school originated by who first stated those very ideas. 
In any case, this is not the only advantage of reading P in terms of the pre-
suppositional account of slurs. In addition, strong Girardians may rely on it 
for promoting an understanding of universality, mimesis and victimization. 
That is, they can sustain all the problematic notions expressing VM by con-
struing them as results of the doxastic conflict raised by hate speech. The ad-
vantage is that such a strategy preserves all the qualifying features of VM (al-
though they appear difficult to defend) while providing a justification for 
them by a reasons-supported theory.
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